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PRIVACY, IDENTITY AND SECURITY
Benjamin Goold*

Getting a list in a few seconds of anyone in the United States who subscribes to a
Middle Eastern newspaper, watches Al-Jazeera, is between the ages of 20 and 35,
and who travelled to Washington on the day of a major political demonstration is but
a few clicks away. When a bureaucrat at the TIA (Total Information Awareness) or
one of its successors performs such a search and you are named by the state, it is not
just ‘information’ that has been gathered. The e-interpellation goes farther than the
information separately considered—by the very act of naming you as a suspect (or
‘person of interest’) you have changed status in the eyes of others who know about
this, and if you come to know or fear, in your eyes as well.
P Galison and M Minow, ‘Our Privacy, Ourselves’ 1

In recent years, events such as the attacks of 9/11 and the July 7 London bombings
have given rise to major pieces of security legislation in countries like the United
Kingdom and the United States. Enacted within months of each other, both the AntiTerrorism, Crime and Security Act (2001) and the USA PATRIOT Act (2001) contain
a range of provisions aimed at increasing the ability of the police, security services
and other law enforcement agencies to detect and combat terrorist activities.2 The
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Walker for their considerable help with subsequent drafts. Any remaining errors or omissions are
my own.
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Galison, P and Minow, M, ‘Our Privacy, Ourselves in the Age of Technological Intrusions’ in R
Ashby Wilson, Human Rights in the ‘War on Terror’ (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
2005) 282–83.
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Following a ruling by the House of Lords in A and others v Secretary of State for the Home
Department [2004] UKHL 56 that the powers contained in Part 4 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and
Security Act (2001) were incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights, Part 4 was
repealed by the Prevention of Terrorism Act (2005). As a result, all measures contained within the
Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act (2001) now apply equally to nationals as well as non-
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enactment of these Acts, which have been hailed by politicians on both sides of the
Atlantic as vital weapons in the ‘war on terror’, can be directly linked to recent largescale terrorist events. However, many of the reforms ushered in by these pieces of
legislation—although unusually bold and certainly unprecedented in terms of their
scope—have largely been in keeping with established trends in the expansion of state
power and the decline of privacy in the last years of the twentieth century. In
particular, both Acts have led to a marked acceleration in the already rapid growth of
existing surveillance networks in the UK and the US. Moreover, the Acts have played
a key role in breaking down barriers between various law enforcement agencies, as
well as between state and non-state organisations—increasing the ease with which
personal information can be exchanged.
Aside from significantly expanding the surveillance capacities of the state and
creating new concerns for individual privacy, the Anti-Terrorism and PATRIOT Acts
have also weakened longstanding due process protections and the right to a fair trial.
This general erosion of the rights of the majority brought about by these and
subsequent Acts—though disturbing in and of itself—has been accompanied by a
sustained attack on the freedoms of particular minorities, such as Middle Eastern and
Muslim communities. Regardless of the intentions of the governments behind them,
the provisions contained in these Acts represent a serious retreat from a commitment
to human rights in general and a damaging attack on individual privacy in particular.
Privacy is protected as a right—albeit a qualified one—in both the UK and the
US, and measures that threaten to undermine individual expectations of privacy must

nationals. The USA PATRIOT Act was renewed on 2 March 2006 by both Houses of Congress and
subsequently signed into law by President George W Bush on 9 March 2006.

2

therefore be taken extremely seriously.3 A great deal has been written about the
changing nature of surveillance and the extent to which 9/11 has contributed to the
erosion of personal privacy in many Western democracies.4 However, the aims and
provisions of the Anti-terrorism Act and the USA PATRIOT Act should also be seen
as significant because they bring to the fore the complex dynamic between security,
surveillance, privacy and the construction of identity. The fervour with which security
has recently been pursued has not only led to more surveillance and less privacy in the
UK and the US, but also contributed to a major shift in the way in which personal
identity is constructed and understood by both the state and individual citizens.
In this chapter, the relationship between security, surveillance, privacy and
identity will be explored, both in the context of recent legislation such as the Antiterrorism Act and the PATRIOT Act, and also in the light of ongoing changes in the
ways that personal information is gathered, processed and used. In particular, it will
be argued that prevailing notions of privacy—and the legal frameworks that aim to
protect privacy interests—are ill-suited to defending individuals from an increasingly
sophisticated array of surveillance and data processing techniques, which enable
information to be acquired and shared at almost zero-cost and which threaten to
establish the ‘categorical identity’ as the primary means by which we are known—to
the state and, more disturbingly, to each other.

3

In the United Kingdom, privacy—as defined by art 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR)—is protected under the Human Rights Act (1998). In contrast, in the United States
privacy derives its status as a right from the First, Forth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution. For a discussion of privacy rights in the US, see Alderman, E and Kennedy, C, The
Right to Privacy (New York, Knopf, 1995); and Goold, B, ‘Open to All? Regulating Open Street
CCTV and the Case for “Symetrical Surveillance”’ (2006) 25(1) Criminal Justice Ethics 3–17.
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See, for example, Galison and Minow (2005).
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REMOVING BARRIERS, REDUCING PRIVACY
Speaking immediately after the signing into law of the USA PATRIOT Act in
October 2001, President George W Bush observed that the Act represents a
significant step towards the greater integration of law enforcement and security
agencies in the United States, in part because it removes many of the barriers to interagency communication that existed prior to the events of September 11:
This legislation gives … intelligence operations and criminal operations the chance
to operate not on separate tracks, but to share vital information so necessary to
disrupt a terrorist attack before it occurs. As of today, we’re changing the laws
governing information-sharing.5

The issue that Bush was referring to here is known generally in the US as
‘linkage blindness’6 and is now recognised as the major reason behind the failure of
the American intelligence services to predict the catastrophic events of September
11.7 In an effort to address this problem, the PATRIOT Act removed many of the
barriers to communication between key agencies such as the Federal Bureau of
Investigations (FBI) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), while at the same
5

‘President Signs Anti-terrorism Bill: Remarks by the President at Signing of the PATRIOT Act’, The
White House, 26 October 2001, quoted by Privacy International, ‘Terrorism Profile: US’ (3 October
2005), available at http://www.privacyinternational.org (accessed 31 September 2006).

6

According to Egger, linkage blindness typically arises when organisations fail to recognise areas of
mutual interest or jurisdictional overlap and as a consequence duplicate work and refrain from
sharing crucial information. See Egger, SA, Serial Murder: An Elusive Phenomenon (Westport, CT,
Praeger, 1990); and Egger, SA, ‘A Working Definition of Serial Murder and the Reduction of
Linkage Blindness’ (1984) 12 Journal of Police Science and Administration 348–57.

7

In its report to Congress in December 2002, the Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities
before and after the Terrorist Attacks of September 11 echoed earlier concerns about the problem of
linkage blindness by stating in its conclusions (84):
Serious problems in information sharing also persisted, prior to September 11, between the
Intelligence Community and non-Intelligence Community agencies. This included other
federal agencies as well as state and local authorities. This lack of communication and
collaboration deprived those other entities, as well as the Intelligence Community, of access
to potentially valuable information in the ‘war’ against Bin Laden.

A full copy of the report is available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2002_rpt/findings.html
(accessed 11 December 2006).

4

time laying the foundations for the establishment of a new supervisory agency in the
form of the Department of Homeland Security.8 According to section 203(d)(1),
In general, notwithstanding any other provision of law, it shall be lawful for foreign
intelligence or counterintelligence or foreign intelligence information obtained as
part of a criminal investigation to be disclosed to any Federal law enforcement,
intelligence, protective, immigration, national defense, or national security official in
order to assist the official receiving that information in the performance of his official
duties. Any Federal official who receives information pursuant to this provision may
use that information only as is necessary in the conduct of that person’s official
duties subject to any limitations on the unauthorized disclosure of such information.

Before the PATRIOT Act, domestic and foreign intelligence gathering and
surveillance activities had been deliberately kept separate, in part to ensure the
accountability of the various agencies responsible for such tasks and in part to protect
civil liberties.9 These agencies have now been deliberately brought together with clear
instructions to intensify their activities and share whatever information they uncover.
However, the FBI, CIA, Department for Homeland Security and associated
government officials have given little explicit consideration as to how this will affect
the second half of the equation—the protection of civil liberties.
Although no equivalent to the Department for Homeland Security has yet been
mooted for the United Kingdom, the Anti-Terrorism Act also represents a concerted
attempt to improve information gathering and intelligence-sharing by the various
agencies that are charged with the task of preventing terrorism and maintaining state
security.10 Prior to the events of September 11, security services such as MI5 and MI6

8

For a detailed discussion of the provisions of the Act, see Doyle, C, ‘USA Patriot Act: A Sketch’,
(Congressional Research Service report RS21203 for Congress, 2005); and Doyle, C, ‘USA Patriot
Act Sunset: A Sketch’ (Congressional Research Service report RS21704 for Congress, 2005).
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As Brian Hook observed in his testimony before the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence on 9 April 2003, in 1946 President Truman refused to place the CIA under the control
of director of the FBI (who, at that time, was J Edgar Hoover) because he feared concentrating so
much bureaucratic power in a single individual.

10

While the current government has yet to argue for the establishment of an equivalent to the US
Department of Homeland Security, in a recent speech to Demos, a London think tank, the Home
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had never been particularly well-regulated, nor were their interactions with domestic
law enforcement agencies formally constrained.11 As a result, although there may
have been concerns in some quarters about the accountability of these agencies and
the extent to which Parliament was able effectively to monitor their activities, there
were also few significant barriers to inter-agency co-operation and co-ordination.
Nevertheless, with the Anti-terrorism Act the UK government sought to
increase the already significant surveillance powers of the state by removing a number
of formal restrictions on the use of personal information by the police and
immigration services. For example, formerly, section 36 of the Immigration and
Asylum Act (1999) required officials to destroy any fingerprints collected during the
course of an investigation once that case had been resolved. Section 36 of the Antiterrorism Act has now removed this requirement. Through an amendment to the
Police and Criminal Evidence Act (1984), section 92 of the Anti-terrorism Act also
gives the police the power to photograph suspected terrorists regardless of consent.
Significantly, the removal of these restrictions on the use of personal
information has coincided with a renewed effort on the part of the government to

Secretary John Reid suggested that there was a need for a US-style Minster for Homeland Security.
For a report of the speech, see Tempest, M, ‘Britain Facing “Most Sustained Threat since WWII”
says Reid’, The Guardian, 9 August 2006, available at http://politics.guardian.co.uk/terrorism/story/
0,,1840482,00.html (accessed 31 September 2006).
11

A major exception to this general trend came with the enactment of the Regulation of Investigatory
Powers Act (RIPA) in 2000. In addition to repealing the Interception of Communications Act
(1985) (IOCA) and abolishing the post of IOCA Commissioner, RIPA created the position of the
Interception of Communications Commissioner and replaced the Commissioners established under
the Security Service Act (1989) and the Intelligence Services Act (1994) with a single combined
Intelligence Services Commissioner. These two independent Commissioners oversee the activities
of the Security Service (MI5) as well as other public bodies charged with protecting national
security, such the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) and the Government Communications
Headquarters (GCHQ).
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expand the National DNA Database (NDNAD). Established in 1995 by the Forensic
Science Service, the NDNAD currently contains over 2 million DNA samples, with
some 500,000 new samples being added to the database every year.12 Although
NDNAD is already the largest such database in the world, recent legislation allowing
the police to take DNA samples from anyone arrested on suspicion of a recordable
offence—again, regardless of consent—is likely to lead to further significant growth
in the number of samples held.13 As the database expands, the use of genetic profiling
by the police and other law enforcement agencies, in the context of both domestic
crime and terrorism, will also likely increase.14 Coupled with compulsory identity
cards that can be based on some form of biometric identifier, the NDNAD could
conceivably provide the basis for a centralised identity register for the entire United
Kingdom and could lead to further deliberate co-ordination between immigration and
security policy.
Although the FBI’s Combined DNA Indexing System (CODIS) contains
fewer profiles than the NDNAD (in part because the vast majority of samples are
taken from convicted prisoners), the collection of other forms of biometric data, such
12

According to recent Home Office estimates, the NDNAD will hold samples on over 4 million
people—approximately 7 per cent of the population—by 2008. This compares with a figure of
some 700,000 samples when the current Labour government took office in 1997. See ‘Freedom
Fears as DNA Database Expands’, The Daily Telegraph, 5 January 2006.

13

According to s 10 of the Criminal Justice Act (2003), non-intimate DNA samples can be taken when
an individual is in ‘police detention in consequence of his arrest for a recordable offence’ and
provided that a sample of the same type and from the same part of the body has not already been
taken (or, if it has been taken, has proved insufficient). For a discussion of the various legal and
ethical issues raised by the creation of this database, see Williams, R, Johnson, P and Martin, P,
‘Genetic Information and Crime Investigation’ (University of Durham School of Applied Social
Sciences, report, 2004); and Gene Watch UK, The Police National DNA Database: Balancing
Crime Detection, Human Rights and Privacy (Buxton, GeneWatch UK, 2005).

14

McCartney, C ‘Forensic DNA Sampling and the England and Wales National DNA Database: A
Sceptical Approach’ (2004) 12 Critical Criminology 157–78.
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as fingerprints, has also become a priority for the Department of Homeland Security.
At present, almost all non-US nationals are fingerprinted and photographed upon
entry into the United States, and there are proposals for such measures to be extended
to US citizens as well. The Department of State has explicitly drawn a link between
the collection of such data and the successful maintenance of national security:
The use of these identifiers is an important link in US national security, because
fingerprints taken will be compared with similarly collected fingerprints at US ports
of entry under the US-VISIT program. This will verify identity to reduce use of
stolen and counterfeit visas, and protect against possible use by terrorists or others
who might represent a security risk to the US. These two important programs
(collecting fingerprints for visa issuance and verifying travelers’ fingerprints when
they enter the United States) will make travel to the US safer for legitimate travelers,
and also improve safety and national security for all Americans. 15

There may be a danger in drawing too close a comparison between the
American and British responses to the events of September 11, yet as the above
examples make clear, the two governments have adopted a similar approach to
improving state security. In each case, increasing the surveillance powers of the state
and encouraging a greater degree of information sharing amongst state institutions
have been seen as vital to increasing security and preventing future acts of domestic
and international terrorism. Furthermore, both countries are now in the process of
establishing comprehensive databases—based, for the moment at least, on the
compulsory acquisition of biometric information from non-citizens and criminals. The
UK and US governments expect these measures to improve their chances of
identifying and apprehending potential terrorists—despite the amorphous nature of
the threat and the lack of substantive evidence to suggest that surveillance systems,

15

For a copy of this statement, see http://travel.state.gov/visa/immigrants/info/info_1336.html
(accessed 31 September 2006).
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data matching and intelligence-led security measures actually help to prevent largescale terrorist activities.16
In many respects, the fact that both countries have viewed the post-9/11
‘security problem’ in terms of information is unsurprising. Over the past thirty years
the US and UK have grappled with a number of profound social changes—including
increasingly diverse populations, increased mobility of citizens and the development
of ever more flexible and efficient communications technologies—which have had a
particularly significant effect on the ability of the state to provide security for its
citizens.17 These wide-reaching social and technological developments have
contributed to a transformation in the nature and purpose of surveillance. Whereas in
the past maintaining order and security principally involved the control of physical
bodies and the movements of citizens through the use of borders and documentation
like passports and visas, the latter part of the twentieth century saw a shift in the
provision of security from a static process that was generally fixed in time and space
to a dynamic one that is integrated into what Lyon has referred to as ‘a world of
flows’.18 Not only can citizens move freely and easily between towns, cities and even
countries, but ideas and their more concrete manifestations in literature, images,
propaganda, petitions, etc can travel at lightening speeds and reach unimaginably
large numbers of people. Maintaining order and security has therefore become an ever

16

See the contribution by Bernard E Harcourt in this volume.

17

See Garland, D, The Culture of Control (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001) ch 4; and Lyon, D,
Surveillance Society: Monitoring Everyday Life (Buckingham, Open University Press, 2001) ch 6.

18

Lyon (2001),.

9

more complex enterprise that relies less on tracking physical bodies than on tracking
the data trails that individuals leave behind.19
The challenges of securing an increasingly diverse population in an
increasingly complex world did not appear out of the blue; but what makes September
11 significant is that it marks the moment at which it became acceptable for
governments to draw a direct and very public connection between the demand for
security and the need for improved means of general surveillance, individual
identification and social control.20 As Levi and Wall have observed, since September
11 the ‘surveillance-society’ model of security has become increasingly viewed as
legitimate, with the result that there has been a considerable increase in the power of
the state.21 While formerly a degree of separation between those responsible for
internal and external security was seen as essential to the preservation of democratic
government, since September 11 it has become standard practice in the US and UK to
assume that breaking down the legal and institutional barriers between law
enforcement and security agencies is both practical and necessary, resulting in the
emergence of an all-embracing concept of ‘national security’.22

19

Lyon, D, ‘Surveillance Studies: Understanding Visibility, Mobility and the Phenetic Fix’ (2003) 1(1)
Surveillance and Society 3.

20

This point has also been made by the group Privacy International. See ‘Increased Abuse of Data and
Disregard for Protections’ (Privacy International press statement, 9 August 2004, available at
http://www.privacyinternational.org (accessed 31 September 2006).

21

Levi, M and Wall, DS, ‘Technologies, Security, and Privacy in the Post-September 11 European
Information Society’ (2004) 31(2) Journal of Law and Society 203.

22

This point is made clearly in a recent Department of Homeland Security press release: ‘A critical
obstacle to cooperation across the Federal government is to integrate data created by different
agencies for different systems and different purposes.’ See ‘Secure Borders and Open Doors in the
Information Age’ (Department of Homeland Security fact sheet, 17 January 2006), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press_release_0838.shtm (accessed 4 December 2006).
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The removal of these barriers has serious implications for individual privacy.
As many civil libertarians and privacy advocates have argued, as the surveillance
power of the state expands, the number of truly private spaces available for
individuals necessarily contracts, with the result that it becomes increasingly difficult
for citizens to ‘keep things to themselves’.23 Furthermore, as Galison and Minow have
observed, because legislation such as the Anti-terrorism Act and the USA PATRIOT
Act helps to reinforce the view that it is worth sacrificing considerable amounts of
privacy for the promise of security, it only exacerbates existing powerful anti-privacy
trends in other areas of our social and economic lives:
[F]ailures to attend to privacy in the design of technology, the articulation and
enforcement of laws, and in the mechanisms of markets and politics produce
downwards spirals, reducing both the scope of experiential privacy and people’s
expectation of and hope for privacy.24

The idea that individuals should be able to retain control over certain types of
information about themselves and their dealings—and determine who has access to
that information—underpins a number of different conceptions of the right to
privacy.25 It is also an idea that has to varying degrees found support in both British

In many respects, this new idea of ‘national security’ closely resembles the German concepts
of Staatssicherheit or Staatsschutz. I am indebted to Eric Topfler for the observation that one
additional consequence of this all-embracing approach to security is the tactical, as well as
organisational, convergence of the police and the military. As security becomes a more important
part of the national agenda, not only do we see a sharing of information and the development of
stronger organisational links between the police and the security services, but also domestic security
bodies ‘borrowing’ weapons and tactics from the military and others more traditionally associated
with external, international defence.
23

See, for example, Stanley, J and Steinhardt, B, ‘Bigger Monster, Weaker Chains: The Growth of an
American Surveillance Society’ (ACLU Technology and Liberty Program, 2003).

24

Galison and Minow (2005), note 1 above, 258.

25

For a defence of this particular view of privacy, see Fried, C, An Anatomy of Values (Cambridge,
Harvard University Press, 1970); and Parent, W, ‘Privacy, Autonomy, and Self-Concept’ (1983) 24
American Philosophical Quarterly 81–89. A critique of this approach to privacy, or at least Parent’s
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and American law. Yet while it is clear that the pursuit of security poses a threat to
this aspect of privacy, in the remaining sections of this chapter it will be argued that
there are deeper issues at stake than the loss of what we may call ‘informational
privacy’. Privacy, it will be argued, is not simply about the keeping of secrets or the
restriction of access to information. Rather, it is also about maintaining a degree of
control over one’s identity—an endeavour that is by nature much more indefinable
and fluid but also goes to the heart of what it is to be human/maintaining human
dignity.

CHANGING NOTIONS OF IDENTITY: NARRATIVES AND CATEGORIES
One of the central challenges of the modern state has been to find ways in which to
identify citizens.26 Passports, identity cards and social security numbers all represent
attempts to ensure that each individual is readily and unmistakably distinguishable
from others. Without stable identities and reliable mechanisms for identification, it is
difficult for states to exercise any hold over those who live within their borders, or to
ensure that they are able to protect against internal and external threats.27 At a more
mundane level, reliable methods of identification are also essential to the running of
anything other than the most minimal state. As Rose has observed, although

account of it, can be found in DeCew, J, In Pursuit of Privacy: Law, Ethics, and the Rise of
Technology (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1997).
26

This problem has not been confined to the state but also confronts private organisations. In order to
highlight the relationship between state security and surveillance, however, in this chapter the
primary focus will be on states and their attempts to document the identity of individuals.

27

See Higgs, E, ‘The Rise of the Information State: The Development of Central State Surveillance of
the Citizen in England, 1500–2000’ (2001) 14(2) Journal of Historical Sociology 175–97; and
Torpey, JC, The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship and the State (Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 2000).
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individuals may at times resist, participation in modern society necessarily involves
allowing oneself to be identified and, more crucially, classified:
It is impossible to participate in almost any contemporary practice without being
prepared to demonstrate identity in ways that inescapably link individuation and
control. The modes of identification are multiple: computer-readable passports,
driving licenses with unique identification codes, social insurance numbers, bank
cards, credit cards… Each card identifies the bearer with a virtual identity—a
database record storing personal details—whilst at the same time allowing access to
various privileges.28

As anyone who has tried to open a bank account or obtain a licence to drive a
car knows, it is almost impossible to live a normal life without some form of officially
recognised identification document. Furthermore, we have come to accept that
government agencies and private companies regularly obtain, keep and exchange
information about us, often with a view to classifying us according to given sets of
characteristics. For example, most people now regard it as normal and reasonable for
the state to inquire about such things as an individual’s employment status, level of
income and marital status, particularly if that individual is seeking welfare subsidies,
tax relief or some other kind of state benefit.29 Equally, we willingly disclose
information about our assets, financial liabilities and spending habits to banks in order
to receive loans, mortgages and credit cards. Having to share personal information is
widely understood to be one of the prices we pay in order to participate in society and
enjoy many of the benefits the modern state has to offer.
While most people may not feel particularly concerned about having to tell the
government exactly how many children or other dependents they might have, or
inform a bank the amount of money they spent on loan repayments in the previous

28

Rose, N, Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought (Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 1999) 240–41.

29

Gilliom, J, ‘Struggling with Surveillance: Resistance, Consciousness and Identity’ in K Haggerty and
R Ericson (eds), The New Politics of Surveillance and Visibility (Toronto, University of Toronto
Press, 2006) 111–40.
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year, many are unaware of just how much the state and private sector companies
actually know about them. In part, this is due to the fact that as we make more and
more use of technologies like the mobile phone, credit cards and the internet, we leave
behind us digital trails that may contain a wealth of personal information. If you shop
online with any degree of regularity, you reveal not only your address but over time
also various consumption preferences and possibly information about your credit
worthiness. In addition, thanks to the spread of new and increasingly sophisticated
surveillance techniques and technologies—such as CCTV cameras, internet cookies
and computer spyware—many of our activities are now monitored without our
knowledge and information collected without our consent.
This intensification in the level of state and private surveillance has had two
distinct effects. First, in countries such as the US and the UK, it has led to a
significant reduction in levels of personal privacy and confidentiality. This is
something that numerous commentators have drawn attention to in recent years, with
the result that many contemporary critiques of surveillance focus almost exclusively
on the negative implications of new surveillance technologies.30 Secondly, the
intensification of surveillance has also transformed the way in which individuals are
viewed and treated by the state and an increasing number of private organisations.
As surveillance has become more widespread (and information and
communication technologies more efficient), the process of individual classification
has become vastly more sophisticated. For example, whereas in the past government
agencies may have been limited to using relatively simple categories when attempting
to identify and distinguish between citizens, with the advent of computerised

30

For an example of such an account, see Davies, S, Big Brother: Britain’s Web of Surveillance and
the New Technological Order (London, Pan Books, 1996).
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databases and automated data-matching techniques, they are now capable of crossreferencing large amounts of personal information and drawing extremely finegrained individual distinctions. No longer are individuals sorted according to a
handful of basic criteria such as gender, date and place of birth, income level and
marital status. Instead, governments and private organisations are able to build
profiles based on hundreds of separate pieces of information—such as how many cars
someone owns or what periodicals he or she subscribes to—and instantly modify
those profiles as new information becomes available. Equally, companies like
Amazon.com that use software that relies on records of past purchases to make
product recommendations to their regular customers can over time develop customer
profiles that are extremely textured and eerily accurate in their ability to predict future
preferences, a fact hailed with pride by the company’s founder, Jeff Bezos:
We not only help readers find books, we also help books find readers, with
personalized recommendations based on the patterns we see. I remember one of the
first times this struck me. The main book on the page was on Zen. There were other
suggestions for Zen books, and in the middle of those was a book on how to have a
clutter-free desk. That’s not something that a human editor would have ever picked.
But statistically, the people who were interested in the Zen books also wanted clutterfree desks. The computer is blind to the fact that these things are dissimilar in some
way that’s important to humans. It looks right through that and says yes, try this. And
it works.31

The growing use and sophistication of surveillance-based methods of
individual classification has important implications for the relationship between the
individual and the state. More specifically, a tension has emerged between two
fundamentally opposed conceptions of identity: the narrative and the categorical.
According to Ricoeur, individuals typically seek to make sense of their own identities
by constructing narratives about themselves and those around them, and it is through

31

Quote taken from a Wired Magazine interview with Jeff Bezos. See Anderson, C, ‘The Zen of Jeff
Bezos’, Wired Magazine, January 2005, available at http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/13.01/
bezos.html (accessed 31 September 2006).
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these narratives that an individual is able to develop a sense of self that is fluid and
that recognises the existence and autonomy of others.32 Drawing on Ricoeur,
Dauenhauer has observed:
We make sense of our own personal identities in much the same way as we do of the
identity of characters in stories. First, in the case of stories, we come to understand
the characters by way of the plot that ties together what happens to them, the aims
and projects they adopt, and what they actually do. Similarly I make sense of my own
identity by telling a story about my own life. In neither case is the identity like that of
a fixed structure or substance. These identities are mobile… Until the story is
finished, the identity of each character or person remains open to revision. 33

In contrast to such narrative identities, categorical identities stress the
importance of particular personal characteristics with a view to determining whether
an individual belongs to some pre-defined group. Personal information is viewed as
static and capable of being distilled into data, which can in turn be combined and used
as the basis for making statements about an individual’s character and—even more
crucially for states concerned about issues of security—predictions about his or her
future behaviour. Whereas the notion of narrative identity focuses on the uniqueness
of individuals and their innate capacity to evolve and develop relationships with other
people, the notion of categorical identity is based on the belief that human beings are
capable of being summarised and understood in terms of lists. As Franko Aas has
written,
[A categorical] identity is not marked by its unique biography and a certain internal
development, but is rather adjusted to the ‘computer’s ontology’: composed of items
of information that like Lego bricks can be taken apart and clearly understood as well
as fit with other items of information in new configurations. 34
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In part, the tension between these two notions of identity can be traced to the
emergence of the modern bureaucratic state. Indeed, the categorical identity has its
origins in the nineteenth-century paper file, which was a crucial tool in the first
systematic attempts by governments to identify and collect information about
individuals. During the first half of the twentieth century, for those concerned about
the growth of state power and the dangers of totalitarianism, the file came to be seen
as deeply symbolic of the dehumanising nature of bureaucracy and the struggle for
individual freedom. Although it is now common to regard Orwell’s novel 1984, in
which privacy is non-existent, as merely a dystopic vision, it can also be interpreted as
an account of what happens when it is the state, rather than individuals, who makes
even basic decisions about identity.
Regardless of how someone chooses to define himself or herself, or how
individuals are seen by those who know them personally, in the modern state it is the
file that forms the basis of all administrative decision making. Furthermore, because it
is necessary for the state to assume that the information contained in an individual’s
file is accurate, the categorical or administrative identity that emerges from that file
must be preferred to any alternative narrative account. Someone may regard herself,
for example, as a good mother who has made a new life for her children by moving to
another country and earning money by cleaning other people’s houses. For the state,
however, if the information contained in a file says otherwise, then it is the categorical
identity that will ultimately prevail: this same person is a single parent, unemployed
and an illegal immigrant.
Although most people probably do not think of their relationship to the state
(or private organisations) in terms of a competition between their own narrative
accounts of themselves and some categorical identity that is constructed for them, this
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is largely because until very recently categorical identities and their real effects on
everyday life have been relatively limited. These two conceptions of identity only
come into competition when the categorical overlaps, contradicts and supplants the
narrative, and so long as categorical identities are based on a narrow range of
information, the possibility of such conflict remains limited. Yet as governments
collect more and more personal information and as advances in information and
communications technology make it easier to store, process and retrieve that
information, the complexity and scope of the categorical identities they construct
gradually increases, as does the potential for conflict with other conceptions of
identity.
While personal narratives for most part remain the dominant means by which
we understand identity in modern society, four related developments—all of which
are taking place against a growing obsession with issues of security—have led to
increased competition and conflict between narrative and categorical identities. First,
advances in surveillance technology and techniques now make it possible for
governments to collect many previously unavailable forms of information, such as
digital recordings of activities in public (via CCTV), information about activities
online (via surveillance programmes such as Carnivore) and records of
communications between people (via mobile phone records, email, etc).
Second, developments in information technology have made it much easier for
government agencies to share such information amongst themselves and with private
institutions, and to draw additional information from the public domain. With the
advent of sophisticated search engines, it is now possible for government officials and
company employees to access large amounts of information about an individual from
a vast array of sources. Furthermore, the ability to replicate and share digital
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information has meant that the idea of the single, comprehensive file has become
largely redundant. Instead, categorical identities are increasingly based on the
convergence of many separate bodies of information, all of which are brought
together by a single identifier—such as a national insurance or social security number.
Third, advances in data matching and the development of so-called
‘algorithmic surveillance’ techniques have made it possible to automate many
decision-making processes that rely on categorical identities.35 Systems such as the
American Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-screening System (CAPPS) programme
are a good example of this, as are online application forms that compare the
information submitted by an individual against multiple databases before making a
decision on whether that individual is entitled to a particular welfare benefit or is
required to pay more tax.
Finally, the failure of existing privacy and data protection frameworks to keep
pace with these developments has meant that many individuals are unable to
determine what exactly the state knows—or thinks it knows—about them. It is
therefore difficult for individuals to contest with effectiveness the categorical
identities that have been constructed for them.
Although not all of these developments are technologically determined, they
can clearly be traced to recent advances in surveillance, information processing and
digital communication. In the past such advances were largely driven by the desire of
governments to streamline decision-making and improve administrative efficiency.
However, the extremely detailed, textured profiles of citizens that are now available to
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states hardly seem necessary merely to distinguish individuals from one another for
the purposes of tax, benefits, voting, etc. Instead, since 9/11, it is security—defined in
terms of the ability of the state to protect its citizens from internal and external
threats—that is the primary rationale for increasing levels of state surveillance and
improving data-sharing. This has resulted in the rapid, simultaneous expansion and
convergence of surveillance networks and databases in countries such as the US and
UK.
Categorical identities have moreover become increasingly important, as they
provide the basis for assessments of risk and pre-emptive measures aimed at
increasing security. Perhaps the best example of this is the growing use of algorithmic
surveillance in airports. Each time a passenger passes through airport security, various
databases are drawn together, his or her categorical identity is reconstructed and
automatically scrutinised, and then that identity is used to determine whether the
passenger represents a threat to security. Passengers who are classified as such a
threat can suddenly find themselves subjected to additional searches, questions and
possible detention. Rarely, if ever, are individuals told why they are considered to be
‘high risk’, nor are they given opportunities to query the information or decisionmaking process that led to their ‘high risk’ classification. Once such a categorical
identity has been established, it trumps all other competing accounts of the individual,
at least insofar as matters of security are concerned.36
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The growing reliance on categorical identities has many serious implications.37
As Calhoun has observed, the use of categorical identities has a tendency to produce
repressive and discriminatory outcomes because the very notion of categorical
identities favours sameness over difference and regards identity as a function of
membership of a group:
[The imposition of categorical identities] allows a kind of abstraction from the
concrete interactions and social relationships within which identities are constantly
renegotiated, in which individuals present one identity as more salient than another,
and within which individuals achieve some personal sense of continuity and balance
among their various sorts of identities… The abstractness of categories encourages
framing claims about them as though they offer a kind of trump card over the other
identities of individuals addressed by them. This encourages an element of repression
within the powerful categorical identities.38

As a case in point, a bank manager who must decide whether or not to grant a
personal loan may not be willing (or allowed) to take into consideration the
applicant’s own account of his or her financial history; but the bank manager will
almost certainly base the decision on a categorical identity made up of the applicant’s
credit rating, account history, employment status, etc. Even if the manager believes
the applicant is sincere when he or she promises to repay the loan on time, and even if
the manager believes the applicant has the means to do so, the categorical identity will
almost certainly remain the primary determinant, and the loan may be refused.
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Aside from having the effect of reducing the applicant to a handful of
numerical indicators, this process of decision-making is extremely hard to challenge.39
Regardless of how implausible the categorisation, it typically is not the organisation
that utilises the classification who must justify decisions but rather the individual in
question who must prove that he or she been wrongly identified—as someone who is
a credit risk, who requires regular tax audits, who should be on a no-fly list, etc.
Furthermore, as the number of databases increases and the linkages between them
become more complex and well established, it also becomes difficult for individuals
to determine why they have been classified in a particular way in the first place.
Credit records are, for example, now based on information drawn from a vast array of
sources, making it extremely difficult for the average person to uncover where any
‘black mark’ may have come from.40
Taken to an extreme, the use of sophisticated categorical identities by the state
and private companies has the potential to undermine the way in which ordinary
individuals understand themselves. Confronted with a world in which identity is
increasingly defined according to the information contained in databases, where
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routine decisions are made by algorithms rather than by people, it becomes
progressively more difficult for individuals effectively to assert alternative visions of
themselves.41 If an ‘intelligent’ data-matching process that draws on a vast array of
interconnected databases determines that I am a potential security risk, how do I deny
this? Do I question the information on which the decision is based? The decisionmaking process itself? What if the information is correct and the decision is, on its
face, reasonable, but wrong?42 How do I explain, for example, that although I may
have been interested in extremist politics as a student, I have now disavowed them?
Or even more problematically, how do I argue that I still subscribe to radical political
ideas but am not a terrorist risk because of a commitment to non-violence? Like a
criminal record, the categorical identity has the potential to rob individuals of the right
to define themselves beyond its confines and to develop as individuals.43
Although various social, political and technological changes have contributed
to the growing importance of categorical identities over the past forty years,
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developments since September 11 threaten to tip the balance even more in favour of
categorical identities. Looked at through a different lens, it is also possible to
characterise these changes in terms of the demise of administrative discretion and the
emergence of a deep organisational reliance on automated decision-making.
Legislation such as the PATRIOT Act and the Anti-Terrorism Act is significant not
only because it seeks to remove barriers to information sharing and to promote cooperation between law enforcement agencies, but also because it helps to reinforce the
view that categorical identities based on information obtained through surveillance
and generated by data-matching techniques, are the only appropriate basis of state–
individual interaction. The pursuit of security along these lines is dangerous not
simply because it undermines claims to individual privacy, but because it threatens to
normalise and make ubiquitous a way of constructing identity that is inherently
dehumanising and has the potential to institutionalise various forms of cultural and
ethnic discrimination.
Faced with a growing emphasis on security and a steadily expanding network
of state and commercial surveillance, what chance do we have for resisting the shift
from narrative to categorical constructions of identity? The most obvious answer to
this question is of course to bolster existing privacy protections with a view to making
it more difficult for the state and private companies to acquire and share personal
information. However, many of the agencies and institutions that represent a threat to
privacy are powerful, well-funded and closely integrated into larger state systems.
Any attempt to limit them is therefore unlikely to be very effective. This is a point
that is well-illustrated by the recent case of the Total Information Awareness (TIA)
programme in the United States, which aimed at vastly improving the US
government’s data mining capacities. Although the Defence Advanced Research
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Projects Agency (DARPA) was forced by Congress to suspend development of the
TIA system following an outcry from civil libertarians and journalists, there can be
little doubt that many of the activities planned for the TIA are now being performed
by other government agencies.44 As Galison and Minow have observed,
Like a ball of mercury, the data-mining activities scatter and grow less visible once
subjected to pressure. Public concerns about privacy have generated more secrecy
about the government activities that jeopardise personal privacy. 45

Given the difficulty of comprehensively protecting privacy interests through
legislation and regulation, it is clear that a multi-pronged strategy is necessary to
respond effectively to the growing obsession with security and surveillance. Legal and
institutional reform must be accompanied by other measures that are designed to
foster a general respect for privacy and to mitigate the de-humanising effects of
categorical identities. With this larger aim in mind, the following section will consider
several models of privacy and their implications for both security and personal
identity.

PRIVACY, IDENTITY AND INFORMATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION
The Value of Privacy
Privacy rights are notoriously difficult to define, in part because they often overlap
with other substantive rights—such as the right to liberty—that are both wellestablished and well-defined, and also because there is often dispute over what it is
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that privacy seeks to protect.46 According to Thomson, a leading proponent of the
right to privacy, it is impossible to define privacy because the right to privacy is in
fact composed of a cluster of other rights, typically property rights and the right to
bodily integrity.47 As such, when we claim that our privacy has been violated, what
we really mean to say is that some other substantive right has been infringed upon. In
this sense, privacy is a fundamentally derivative concept.48
One approach to the question of defining privacy is to regard privacy as the
control of personal information.49 In Westin’s now famous book Privacy and
Freedom, he argues that privacy is fundamentally concerned with the ability of
‘individuals, groups or institutions to determine for themselves when, how and to
what extent information about them is communicated to others’.50 This view has
recently been taken further by Parent, who suggests that one of the fundamental
conditions of privacy is the ability to prevent others from acquiring or holding
undocumented personal information about oneself.51 For Parent, such personal
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information is necessarily factual and includes such things as details about one’s
health, marital and financial status, educational background and sexual orientation.
While he does not go so far as to claim that there is a clear legal or moral right to
privacy, Parent makes clear that the loss of control over such personal information can
lead to far-reaching consequences and very real effects for the lives of individuals:
[I]f others manage to obtain sensitive personal knowledge about us they will by that
very fact acquire power over us. Their power could then be used to our disadvantage.
The possibilities for exploitation become very real. The definite connection between
harm and the invasion of privacy explains why we place a value on not having
undocumented personal information about ourselves widely known.52

In contrast to this emphasis on the control of information, other writers have
suggested that privacy is best understood in terms of its connection to ideas of
personal autonomy, self-determination and human dignity. This approach, which
frequently leads to privacy being framed in terms of the right to a private or family
life, has tended to dominate legal discussion of privacy in both the US Supreme Court
and the European Court of Human Rights. Privacy in this sense goes well beyond
control over information and looks to provide individuals with the means to protect
themselves against intrusions that might compromise their independence and
represent an affront to their sense of human dignity.
According to Feldman, privacy rights are important because they enable
individuals and groups to determine and, to some extent at least, control the
boundaries between different interlocking social spheres.53 In this regard, he argues, it
is important to recognise the communitarian aspects of the idea of privacy. If we view
society as a ‘community of communities’, made up of groups with different
memberships that may or may not overlap, then privacy provides the mechanism by
which these groups are able to preserve their independence while also interacting with
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one another. At the individual level as well, a notion of privacy is valuable insofar as
it enables us to limit the extent to which we are subjected to the demands and
judgments of others.
Within this framework, privacy rights deserve protection because they are
essential for the maintenance of personal autonomy and enable individuals to
maintain a range of different and valuable social relationships.54 If we are constantly
required to respond to the expectations of those around us, our choices are unlikely to
be free, nor are we likely to develop a capacity for self-determination or a degree of
self-fulfilment. Privacy is hence essential for the establishment and maintenance of a
unique sense of self. Indeed, as Galison and Minow have observed, privacy and the
construction of personal identity are intimately connected:
Even though its meanings are multiple and complex, privacy in closely connected
with the emergence of a modern sense of self. Its jeopardy signals serious risk to the
very conditions people need to enjoy the kind of self that can experiment, relax, form
and enjoy intimate connections, and practice the development of ideas and beliefs for
valued expression.55

Of course, these two approaches—privacy as the control of information and
privacy as the protection of individual autonomy—are not entirely incompatible with
one another. If one views control over personal information not merely in terms of a
narrow conception of ownership or of secrecy but rather as essential to the
maintenance of individual autonomy and dignity, then it follows that spheres of
privacy are as much about controlling how information about oneself is
communicated to the outside world as it is about controlling who has access to us and
our activities. After all, as Lustgarten and Leigh argue, the collection of personal
information without an individual’s consent can amount to a serious affront to human
dignity and demonstrate an absence of respect for their need for personal autonomy:
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Imagine being unable to draw the curtain in your bedroom, so that others can see you
naked at any time of their choosing. The fear and revulsion this image evokes has
little to do with the beauty or otherwise of one’s body, but everything to do with
one’s sense of self. If I have no control over what is known about me, I am seriously
diminished as a person both in my own eyes and in those which are capable of
intruding upon me.56

If we accept this view of privacy, then it follows that there is a clear
relationship between privacy and the construction of personal identity. As we move
from very private spheres (for example, the home) into increasingly less private ones
(such as the workplace), each step requires us to surrender some amount of control
over information about ourselves, information that can then be shared and its meaning
potentially transformed. The more public my activities, the more susceptible they are
to being known, interpreted and judged by others, with the result that my capacity to
define myself—to construct my own narrative identity or to resist a categorical
identity that might be imposed upon me by the state—diminishes. This is of course
one of the reasons why we often feel most secure in the context of the home. It is not
simply because we have considerable control over the space around us, but also
because we can more or less be who we want to be.
Privacy rights are valuable then not simply because they are essential to the
maintenance of personal autonomy or the defence of human dignity, or even because
they endow us with some modicum of control over information about ourselves.
Privacy is important because of its relationship to the construction of identity and
because of the way in which it helps us to develop and defend particular visions of
self. In making a demand for privacy, we reassert control over information about
ourselves and make it more difficult for those who would seek to categorise us or
reduce our identity to a list of particular traits or characteristics.
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An Expanded Model of Privacy
The relatively broad conception of privacy outlined above may go some way
in drawing a connection between privacy and human dignity—and hence human
rights—but it is unlikely on its own to provide an adequate basis for resisting the
pressures of security and the attendant drive from narrative to categorical notions of
identity. There are two reasons for this. First, central to even the broadest conception
of privacy is the assumption that it is possible to agree on what constitutes personal
information deserving of protection. Yet as Nissenbaum has argued, the meaning of
any piece of information is at least in part determined by its context and the manner in
which it is disclosed. The fact that I choose to behave or present myself in a certain
way in one context does not mean that I intend to be defined by behaviour and
identity in all other contexts. As Schoeman has rightly observed,
A person can be active in the gay pride movement in San Francisco, but be private
about her sexual preferences vis-à-vis her family and co-workers in Sacramento. A
professor may be highly visible to other gays at the gay bar but discreet about sexual
orientation at the university. Surely the streets and newspapers of San Francisco are
public places as are the gay bars in the quiet university town. Does appearing in some
public settings as a gay activist mean that the person concerned has waived her rights
to civil inattention, to feeling violated if confronted in another setting? 57

In a world in which surveillance is becoming ubiquitous and information can
be transmitted almost instantaneously to a multitude of people at virtually zero cost, it
is exceptionally easy for that information to be divorced from its context and for it to
take on new and unexpected meanings. As a consequence, if we are to maintain any
sense of privacy or control over how our identity is constructed, it is important to
develop a concept of privacy that recognises that the meaning of information is
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heavily context dependent and can easily be transformed, abused and/or
misinterpreted.
Nissenbaum has suggested that the solution to this problem is to develop a
model of privacy that is capable of maintaining ‘contextual integrity’, which is
defined as ‘compatibility with presiding norms of information appropriateness and
distribution’.58 According to this principle, we should move away from thinking about
privacy in terms of dichotomies—such as sensitive and non-sensitive information, or
distinctly private and distinctly public spaces—and instead recognise that all areas of
life are subject to flows of information:
Observing the texture of people’s lives, we find them not only crossing dichotomies,
but moving about, into, and out of a plurality of distinct realms. They are at home
with families, they go to work, they seek medical care, visit friends, consult with
psychiatrists, talk with lawyers, go to the bank, attend religious services, vote, shop,
and more. Each of these spheres, realms, or contexts involves, indeed may even be
defined by, a distinct set of norms, which governs its various aspects such as roles,
expectations, actions, and practices. For certain contexts, such as the highly ritualized
settings of many church services, these norms are explicit and quite specific. For
others, the norms may be implicit, variable, and incomplete (or partial)… Contexts,
or spheres, offer a platform for a normative account of privacy in terms of contextual
integrity.59

The second, related reason why many existing models of privacy are unable to
respond to the challenges of modern surveillance and the current overwhelming drive
for security is that they—unlike many of the technologies that now threaten privacy—
are rooted in an increasingly anachronistic view of the distinction between the public
and the private. Modern information flows do not respect traditional physical
boundaries: for example, when I surf publicly accessible internet sites in the privacy
of my own home, am I moving in a private or a public domain? Moreover, many state
institutions now draw on personal information that is collected by the private sector or
has otherwise found its way into the public domain. As a consequence, privacy
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protections that can only be enforced against public bodies—such as the data
protection provisions currently in operation in the United Kingdom—are severely
limited in their application.60
In light of these difficulties, it is clear that if we are concerned about privacy
and the effect that the current obsession with security is having on our ability to
maintain control over our own identities, we must develop a new vision of privacy
that recognises the importance of context and the increasing irrelevance of traditional
notions of the public/private divide. The language and discourse of privacy must, as a
basic starting point, acknowledge the deep connection between information and
identity, while privacy protections must recognise that the meaning of information
and informational norms—that is, the norms of appropriateness and distribution—
vary according to context. Such a vision of privacy would represent a significant
departure from the models that underpin the privacy and data protection laws of the
US and UK. Furthermore, it almost certainly represents a departure form the way in
which most people think about questions of privacy in their everyday lives. Yet just as
we have come to accept that the nature and extent of surveillance has changed in
recent years, so too must society begin to think more creatively and radically about
the concept of privacy and the value of identity.

Informational Self-determination
Assuming that we are prepared to embrace a concept of privacy such as that
outlined above, the question then arises as to how best to protect the privacy interests
that arise from such a model. It is tempting to assume that all that is needed to achieve
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this are more expansive privacy laws. However, as Galison and Minow have argued,
it may be possible to enact legislation that discourages the state from invading the
privacy of individuals, but it is impossible to construct a system of laws that will
provide for the complete protection of privacy or resolve the inevitable conflict
between privacy and the demands of security.61 Instead, what is needed is a multidimensional strategy that not only seeks to transform the way in which the law defines
and protects privacy, but also generates a general demand for privacy within society:
Without deliberate effort [to promote privacy] a downward spiral can become a
vicious circle, eroding privacy through legal permission, technological access to
unprecedented amounts of personal information, and diminishing public expectations
of privacy. Deliberate initiatives in law, technology, and market and educational
strategies designed to generate desire could, in contrast, promote an upward spiral,
moving up while rotating back and forth between positive desires on the one side and
legal/technological constraints on the other. 62

Although it is well beyond the scope of this chapter to outline a
comprehensive strategy for the promotion of individual privacy, one way in which
privacy could be enhanced in the US and the UK is the introduction of a free-standing
right to informational self-determination. Insofar as such a right would increase the
amount of control that individuals are able to exercise over personal information, its
introduction would constitute an important step towards the development of a vision
of privacy that properly recognises the fluid and contextual nature of information in
modern society.
As has already been noted, in order to resist the unwanted imposition of a
categorical identity, it is crucial that individuals are able to determine or at least have
a say in what sorts of personal information are held by the state and, even more
importantly, how that information is used. While data protection laws go some way to
providing this, they typically focus on only regulating the manner in which
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information is acquired; the protection they offer to individuals is therefore limited.
Once information has been shared and is in the public domain, individuals may be
able to take action against the body that ‘leaked’ the information, but there is little
they can do to prevent others from dealing in their personal information or passing it
on. Consequently, what is needed in addition to data protection is some recognition
that individuals ‘own’ information about themselves and should consequently have
control about over what is ultimately done with that information.
For an example of how a right to informational self-determination might work
in practice, one need only go so far as Germany, which legally recognised such a right
over twenty years ago. In 1983, it was held by the Federal Constitutional Court that
all German citizens have a right to what was referred to as ‘informational selfdetermination’. Derived from Articles 1(1) and 2(1) of the Basic Law,63 the right is
regarded as a personal right (Persönlichkeitsrecht) and is limited only by the
‘predominant public interest.’ In justifying the establishment of this new right, the
court was clear in its desire to link issues of autonomy with control of information and
the development of self:
Who can not certainly overlook which information related to him or her is known to
certain segments of his social environment, and who is not able to assess to a certain
degree the knowledge of his potential communication partners, can be essentially
hindered in his capability to plan and to decide. The right of informational selfdetermination stands against a societal order and its underlying legal order in which
citizens could not know any longer who what and when in what situations knows
about them.64
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According to Art 1(1) of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (Grundgesetz), ‘Human
dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority.’ Further
to this, Article 2(2) states: ‘Every person shall have the right to free development of his personality
insofar as he does not violate the rights of others or offend against the constitutional order or the
moral law.’
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Clearly, this German conception of the right to informational selfdetermination goes a long way in addressing many of the concerns raised by
Nissenbaum about the need to acknowledge the contextual dimension of personal
information.65 In addition, it avoids one of the great ironies of traditional privacy
rights—that individuals are required to identify what they regard as private in order to
protect themselves from unwanted intrusions, despite the fact that the mere act of
claiming something is private tells the state that it is something the individual regards
as valuable. The German formulation, however, reverses this burden by requiring the
state—or any other user of personal information—to justify why the use does not
infringe upon an individual’s autonomy and his or her expectation to be able to
control how that personal information is used. Finally, the right to informational selfdetermination has the advantage of not being contingent on transgressions of some
imagined boundary between private and public space; it is therefore better equipped to
protect individual interests in a world of information flows.
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It is important to note, however, that concerns about the scope of the right to informational selfdetermination and the operation of the public interest exception have been raised by a number of
German commentators. According to Wolf-Dieter Narr, for example, in recognising the right to
informational self-determination the Federal Court has in effect helped to pave the way for what he
refers to as ‘Vorwärtsverrechtlichung’ or ‘forward-legislation’. For Narr, regulation designed to
ensure that police and security services are acting in the public interest have ironically led to a
situation in which there has been an increase in police powers and what has been described by
various commentators as an ‘over-regulated absence of regulation’. On these points, see: Narr, WD, ‘Wir Bürger als Sicherheitsrisiko: Rückblick und Ausblick’ (1998) 60 Bürgerrechte &
Polizei/CILIP 30–40, available at http://www.cilip.de/ausgabe/60/narr60.htm (accessed 31
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zu einem Polizeistaat neuen Typs? (2001) Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik 214–21,
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Rechts der Inneren Sicherheit (Bonn, Pahl-Rugenstein, 2000).
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Given the existence of this right, it is perhaps unsurprising that despite similar
calls for an expansion in state surveillance and the extension of existing security
legislation, no equivalent of the PATRIOT Act or the Anti-terrorism Act has as yet
been enacted in Germany. In the face of a strong constitutional commitment to the
idea that individuals have a right to determine how information about themselves is
used, it is difficult for the government, regardless of the public mood, to centralise the
collection of personal details and remove institutional checks on the sharing of
information in the way that has occurred in the US and UK since 9/11. Recognising
such a right in the US or UK context may not provide an unassailable defence against
the excessive surveillance demands of the state or the growing use of categorical
identities, but it deserves serious consideration if only because it would add a new and
substantial level of protection for privacy at a time when other protections are either
failing or being fatally undermined.
In addition, thinking about privacy in terms of informational selfdetermination and attempting to shift current political and legal debates such that the
onus is on the state to better justify the expansion of security-related surveillance
powers may have other benefits that go beyond bolstering existing individual privacy
protections. Closely related to the idea of informational self-determination is the
notion that it is possible to own information about oneself, and as such one of the
arguments in favour of the new right is that it may open the door to broader
discussions about the possible economic value of privacy.
At present, we assume that once an individual (either willingly or unwillingly)
reveals information about him- or herself, that individual’s interest in and claim over
that information is substantially weakened. He or she may attempt to prevent others
from receiving that information or to stop it from being used by certain organisations,
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but there is no suggestion that such assertions of control are based on clear ownership
or concepts of property. If, however, someone who possessed or used information
about another individual were required to financially compensate that person—that is,
required to pay for the privilege of required to pay for the privilege of using someone
else's personal information and asserting a form of control over it—then it is possible
that the use of categorical identities and certain types of surveillance and data
matching would naturally be constrained.66 Governments and organisations would, it
seems reasonable to assume, think twice about acquiring information or sharing it if,
in just the same way copyright royalties are paid to artists, they may also have to pay
the individuals to whom the information pertains.
Although such a market in personal information may be no more likely to
come into being than Brin’s ‘transparent society’, thinking about the applications and
limits of the right to informational self-determination along these lines does provide
the basis for the formulation/conception/conceptualisation of new ways of both
resisting the imposition of categorical identities and reasserting the collective and
individual interest in privacy.

CONCLUSION
In this chapter, an attempt has been made to show how the pursuit of security and the
continued expansion in state surveillance affect privacy and identity. Although it is
clear that legislation such as the Anti-terrorism Act and the PATRIOT Act represents
a threat to many well-established human rights—such as the right to silence and the
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right to a fair trial—there is a danger that because liberals and civil libertarians
continue to focus much of their attention on the threat to these fundamental civil
liberties, we risk losing sight of the fact that many other less well-defined but no less
important rights—including, namely, privacy—are being gradually worn away.
Furthermore, it is important to acknowledge that although the events of September 11
were enormously significant in terms of shifting the balance in the security–rights
debate, many of the threats to individual freedom and autonomy that now appear so
clearly have in fact been present for a very long time.
Security, surveillance, identity and privacy are intimately connected. As states
attempt to increase their ability to defend their citizens from external and internal
threats, they also necessarily risk undermining the ability of the individuals within
their borders to live free from scrutiny, suspicion, categorisation and discrimination.
Many existing privacy protections are incapable of addressing the underlying
challenges posed by the pursuit of security because they were developed during a time
in which the distinction between the public and private was much clearer than it is
today, and because the costs of acquiring, processing and sharing information were
once much higher than they are today. If we are to maintain some degree of control
about the way in which our identities are constructed and used, it is essential not only
to begin to think about what identity and privacy mean, but also to take positive steps
to develop legal and other means of resisting state demands to submit to
categorisation and control. Unless we do so, regardless of whether we are more secure
from physical threats, we may end up surrendering our identities—and in the process,
surrender a part of ourselves.
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